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Kenya's failure to implement adjustment policies after the
collapse  of the coffee  boom  and the breakup  of the East  African
common market reduced private investment sharply in  the
1980s.  Efficient  fiscal  adjustment  and more  liberal  imports  will
be critical to increasing  private investment.
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Matin and Waso use an eclectic version of the  physical infrastructure. And liberalization of
basic accelerator model to assess the determi-  foreign exchange rationing, impeded by the
nants of private investment aiid to analyze how  exogenous fall in export receipts, could not be
adjustment policies (or their absence) affect  implemented because of inadequate fiscal
those determinants. Their model emphasizes the  adjustment. Thus insufficient and uncertain
effect of resource constraints on private invest-  access to imports was a major factor behind the
ment behavior, including that arising from  decline in private investment.
foreign exchange rationing.
Though real depreciation is found to have a
Econometric estimation of the investment  direct negative impact on investment, the authors
model with Kenyan data for 1968-88 suggests  use simulations to show that it has a positive
that Kenya's  failure to implement adjustment  indirect effect on private investment in the
policies after the collapse of the coffee boom and  medium term because such depreciation relaxes
the breakup of the East African common market  the foreign exchange constraint on imports.
reduced private investment sharply in the 1980s.
Declining real credit to private sector, falling  Matin and Wasow conclude that efficient
stocks of public infrastructure capital, and lower  riscal adjustment and liberalization of imports
availability of imports were the main causes of  will be critical for the recovery of private
reduced private investment.  investment in Kenya. Efficient fiscal adjustment
should reduce fiscal deficits so that expenditure
Matin and Wasow argue that inadequate  cuts are structured to protect and even expand
fiscal adjustment was a key failure of policy.  expenditure on physical infrastructure. This
With direct competition between public and  would require substantial reduction and rational-
private sectors for limited financial resources,  ization of current expenditure. Import liberaliza-
fiscal deficits preempted funds and restricted  tion will also have the expected favorable impact
private investors' access to them. In addition,  on investment because such liberalization will be
when cuts in government spending were under-  perceived as credible and sustainable when
taken to contain deficits, they fell disproportion-  accompanied by efficient fiscal adjustment.
ately on capital expenditure, especially that on
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version  of the  paper.I.  INTRODUCTION
Many developing  countries  failed  to  maintain  their  investment  rates  in
the  1980s. While adverse  changes  in the  external  environment  has been
important  in  some countries,  adjustment  policy  aimed  at restraining  fiscal  and
current  account  deficits  has  been  more important  in others. In some  countries
private  investment  was 'crowded  out'  because  the  reduction  in fiscal  deficit
was less  than  the  reduction  in  external  financing. In others,  private
investment  was undermined  because  fiscal  deficit  reductions  were  not
accompanied  by equivalent  reductions  in current  expenditure,  resulting  in
declining  public  investment  expenditure,  especially  on infrastructure.
Similarly,  attempts  to reduce  current  account  deficit  without  reducing  fiscal
deficit  inhibited  private  investment  because  they  made  elimination  of direct
import  controls  difficult. Thus  adjustment  policies  (or  their  absence)  can
influence  private  investment  by affecting  its  key  determinants.
Theoretical  models  of the  determinants  of private  investment  have  been
applied  to developed  countries  with  a fair  degree  of success  (Bischoff,  1969,
1971;  Clark,  1979;  Eisner,  1970,  1972;  Hines  & Costepharous,  1970).
Nevertheless,  empirical  studies  have  not  yet clarified  which of these  models
is a  more accurate  representation  of the  way in  which  capital  formation  occurs
in  developed  countries. This  is  more true  of developing  countries  where  the
assumptions  underlying  the  standard  optimizing  investment  models  are  usually
not  applicable. 1
tFor  example  the  absence  of  well-functioning  financial  markets,  the
relatively  larger  role  of the  government  in capital  formation,  distortions
created  by foreign  exchange  constraints  and  other  market  imperfections  are
contrary  to the  assumptions. In addition  there  is little  or  no data  on stock
of capital,  labor  force  and  wages,  real  financing  rates  etc.  necessary  toE1mpirical  studies  on  the  determinants  of  private  investment  in
developing  countries  have  been  few and  far  between.  Most  o4  theam  have  used  a
much more eclectic  model  of  private  investment  designed  to  capture  the
distinctive  institutional  and  structural  features  of  those  economies.  They
have  combined  the  features  of  the  flexible  accelerator,  neoclassical  and
structural  models  in  an  effort  to  emphasize  the  effects  of  resource
constraints  faced  by  private  investors  in  developing  countries.  The results
of  those  studies  suggest  that  expected  aggregate  demand proxied  typically  by
output,  domestic  credit  constraint  proxied  by  credit  availability  to  private
sector  and  physical  infrastructure  proxied  by  public  investment  expenditure
are  important  determinants  of  private  investment  in  developing  countries
(Sundrajan  & Thakur  1980,  TunWai & Wong 1982,  Blejer  & Khan 1984,  Chhibber  &
Van  Wijnbergen  1988,  Musalam 1988,  Shafik  1990,  Schmidt-Hebbel  and  Muller
1991).  Adjustment  policies  affect  private  investment  because  they  affect
those  determinants.
This  paper  departs  from  the  existing  empirical  literature  on
determinants  of  private  investment  in  two ways.  First,  we incorporate  the
effect  of  changes  in  the  restrictiveness  of  foreign  exchange  allocation  and
changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate,  both  of  which  are  generally  part  of
adjustment  programs.  While  the  impact  of  real  exchange  rate  on  private
investment  has  been  explicitly  investigated  for  several  countries  including
Chile  (Solimano  1989)  d  Indonesia  (Chhibber  & Shafik  1990),  the  effect  of
foreign  exchange  constraint  has  generally  been  ignored  in  the  literature. 2
Second,  we examine  the  determinant-  of  private  investment  for  a  Sub Saharan
implement  those  models  empirically.
2  The only  two  exceptions  are  Billsborrow's  study  of  Colombian  firms'
investment  behavior  (Billsborrow  1977)  and  the  multi-country  study  of  private
investment  by  Fry  (1980).African  country,  (a  region  that  has  been the  focL  of adjustment  programs)  by
appLying  a model  of  private  investment  behavior  to Kenya. 3 9Cenya  presents  an
interesting  case to study  private  investment  because  it  has experienced
relatively  greater  macro-economic  stability  and  because  it  has suffered  large
declines  in investment  in the  1980s  notwithstanding  adjustment  efforts  during
1979-82  and  again  during  1987-90.
The  paper  finds  that  declining  availability  of credit  to  private  sector,
falling  stock  of public  infrastructure  capital  and the  relatively  lower  level
of import  allocations  relative  to  the  1970s  are the  main factors  behind  the
decline  in the  rate  of private  investment  in the  1980s. Adjustment  policies
or rather,  Kenya's  inability  to implement  them  contributed  to this  decline.
The  nature  of fiscal  policies  played  a  key role.  It is thus  argued  that
reversing  those  policies  is critical  to the  restoration  of higher  rates  of
private  investment.  Money  financing  of fiscal  deficit  has to  be reduced  and
current  expenditure,  especially  wage ea;.penditure,  has to  be cut  so as to
increase  public  capital  expenditure,  if  private  investment  is to rise.'  Though
import  liberalization  decreases  uncert:ainty  of access  to imported  goods,  the
absence  of efficient  fiscal  adjustmernt  raises  questions  of future  access. 4
Notwithstanding  the  initial  adverse  e~ffect  of a real  depreciation,  it is found
to  have a favorable  indirect  impact  on private  investment  in the  long-run
because  it  can  relax  the  foreign  exchange  constraint  and increase  import
allocations.
3Note  that  the  sample  of 24  countries  in  Blejer  & Khan (1984)  did  not
include  a sub-saharan  African  cou  try.
4Attempts  to liberalize  imports  in  1980  were aborted  in 1983. The  most
recent  efforts  to liberalize  begoln  in 1987.  Thus  quantitative  allocations  of
imports  has dominated  most  of thh  period  under  study.
3II.  INVESTMENT  TRENDS
Kenya's  total  real  investment  has  been  on a declining  trend  since  1971.
The decline  has  been particularly  severe  after  1978  following  the  collapse  of
the  coffee  boom and the  East  African  Common  Market. Total  real investment
fell  by 7  percent  of GDP  between  1978  and 1988.5 As a share  of real  GDP, it
was 10%  in 1988  relative  to 22% in  1971  and  17% in 1978.
Private  real investment  fell  by 5  percent  of GDP  over the  same  period.
(Figure  l).j  Private  real  investment  was 5.8%  of GDP in 1988  as compared  to 14%
in 1971  and  10.8%  in 1978 (see  Figure  1).  This  reduced  the  share  of the
private  sector  in  Kenya's  total  investment  from  its  peak  of 63.6  percent  in
1971 to  around  50  percent  in 1988.
Private  investment  in  machinery  and  transport  equipment  has  borne  a
disproportionate  share  of the  burden  of this  decline. It has fallen  from
around  7 percent  of GDP to 3.5  percent  between  1978  and  1988 (see  Figure  2).
Thus  the  share  of equipment  in  Kenya's  private  investment  has  decl_.ied  from  66
percent  to 61 percent  over the  same  period.
5This  is  estimated  as the  ratio  of real  investment  to real  GDP.  Total
real  investment  fell  by 6.4  percent  of GDP in the  1980s  from  an average  of
17.4%  of  GDP in the  1970s  (i.e.  1971-81)  to  an average  of 11.0%  in the  1980s
(i.e.  1982-88). Private  investment  fell  by 4.2  percent  of  GDP in the  1980s
relative  to the  1970s,  as compared  to a  fall  of 2.2  percent  of GDP for  public
investmenit.
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EQUIPMENT - BUILDINGSII.  DET  OF PRIVATE  INVESTMENT
The  model  of private  investment  applied  to  Kenya  is an eclectic  version
of the  flexible  accelerator  model 6 designed  to capture  some  of the  key
determinants  of private  investment  behavior. The  basic  accelerator  model is
modified  to provide  greater  emphasis  on the  effects  of resource  constraints
faced  by private  investors  in  developing  countries. It is  assumed  that  such
constraints  iti  respect  of credit  and  foreign  exchange  affect  the  direction  and
speed  of adjustment  of actual  capital  stock  to  desired  capital  stock.
Estimation  Model
In the  long-run  steady  state,  private  sector's  desired  capital  stock  (K,*)  is
assumed  to  be proportional  to expected  output  (Y):
(1)  Kt - a(Y)
There  are two  ways of deriving  an investment  function  from the  above  equation
(Blejer  and  Khan 1989). The first  one  specifies  coeff,  Aent "a"  as a function
of different  variables. Gradual  adjustment  of actual  to desired  capital  stock
is  obtained  in  a standard  way  by using  a local  quadratic  approximation  to
adjustment  costs,  and the  gradual  change  in actual  capital  shock  is the
investment  function.
The alternative  method,  the  one  we use for  this  paper,  keeps "a"
constant,  but assumes  that  the  parameters  of the  quadratic  adjustment  cost
function  are  a function  of different  variables. This formulation  starts  with
6Various  problems  restrict  the  applicability  of a strictly  neoclassical
investment  model  to developing  countries. See  Footnote  1.
7a  partial  adjustment  function  derived  from  a quadratic  adjustment  cost  model
as follows:
(2) I¢l(t-  Cto  It.1)
where Ie is the  desired  level  of investment  in the  steady  state,  which  is
given  by
*3)  Xct*El-(1-6)L]ht:
where  L is the  lag  operator  ar.d  8 is the  proportional  rate  of depreciation.
The  response  of private  invesement  to the  gap  between  desired  and  actual
investment,  as measured  by the  coefficient  P,  is  assumed  to  vary
systematically  with  economic  factors  that  influence  the  ability  of private
investors  to  achieve  the  desired  level  of investment. 7 Our  hypothesis  is
that  the  response  of private  investors  to that  gap  depends  on five factors:
(1)  the  availability  of  credit,  (2)  the  availability  of foreign  exchange,  (3)
the  real  exchange  rate,  (4)  the  stock  of  public  infrastructure  capital  and (5)
macroeconomic  instability.
7For  example,  the  phenomenon  of "crowding  out" is captured  through
affecting  the  speed  of adjugtment  rather  than  through  directly  changing  the
desired  level  of real  private  investment.
8A clear  consensus  has  emerged  in  recent  years  that,  in  contrast  to
developed  countries,  one  of  the  principal  constraints  on  1nsvestment  in
developing  countries  is  the  quantity,  rather  than  the  cost,  of  credit.  The
rates  of  t.-turn  on  investment  in  these  countries  typicslly  tend  to  be  quite
high,  whereas  real  interest  rates  on  loans  are  kept  low  by  goverrments  for  a
variety  of  reasons.  In  such  circumstances  the  investor  cannot  he  expected  to
equate  the  current  marginal  product  of  capital  to  its  se_-vice  cost. Indeed,
because  the  total  amount  of  financing  is  limited  and  the  price  mechanism  is
not  allowed  to  operate  smoothly,  it  would  seem  legitimate  to  argue  that  the
private  investor  in  a  developing  country  is  generally  restricted  by  the  level
of  available  bank  credit. 8 An  increase  in  real  credit  to  the  private  sector
encourages  real ,civate  investment  as  is  confirmed  by  several  empirical
studies  (Fry  1980,  Tybout  1984,  Blejer  and  Khan  1984).
In  most  developing  countries,  both  the  Availability  and  the  real  price
of  foreign  exchange  affect  private  investment.  This  is  because  imports  are
often  rationed  and  the  cost  of  investment  is  influenced  by  the  exchange  zate
and  the  uncertainty  of  access  to  foreign  exchange. 9 If  foreign  exchange  for
imports  is  not  available  on  demand  at  the  prevailing  exchange  rate  because  of
import  rationing,  thean  access  to  imports  at  a  given  exchange  rate  becomes
$The  rudimentary  nature  of  capital  markets  in  developing  countries  limits
the  financ.ing  of  private  investment  to  the  use  of  retained  profits  and  bank
credit.  Of  these,  the  flow  of  bank  credit  to  the  private  sector  is  likely  to
be  qu&ntitatively  the  most  important.
9Several  studies  of  developing  countries  have  found  that  imports  vary
with  the  restrictiveness  of  import  licensing  which  in  turn  varies  with  changes
in  stock  of  foreign  exchange  reserves  (Hemphill  1980,  Moran  1989).  There  is
evidence  that  decisions  of  Government  of  Kenya  on  the  restrictive-less  of
licensing  is  based  on  the  size  of  reserves.  For  example  in  1982/83  Kenyan
government  used  an  explicit  "trigger  mechanism"  for  moving  items  from
restricted  to  unrestricted  list. Movement  of  such  items  were  triggered  on
reserve  increases  above  1.5  months  import  coverage.
9uncertain. Increases  in  the  restrictiveness  of import  rationing  can  reduce
private  investment  in two  ways.  It  can reduce  private  invetment because  of
longer  queuing  time  and/or  greater  uncertainty  of access  to capital  goods
imports. It can  also  reduce  investment  demand  because  the  expected
profitability  of investment  is  lowered  by similar  uncertainty  of access  to
intermediate  imports. Billsborrow  (1977)  finds  evidence  of the  effect  of
import  allocations  proxied  by reserves  on firm  investment  in  Colombia.
Real depreciation  affects  private  investment  through  several  channels
not all  of  which  work in the  same  direction. First,  real  devaluation  raises
the  cost  of capital  goods  and  acts  like  an adverse  supply  shock  on investment,
the size  of which  depends  on the  import  content  of investment  (Buffie  1986,
Branson  1986). Second,  it  raises  the  price  of imported  intermediate  inputs.
Both lower  profitability  of investment  in the  nontradable  sector  and  thus slow
down the  adjustment  response  of private  investment. On the  other  hand  real
devaluation  can  also  raise  investment  by raising  profitability  of private
investment  in the tradable  sector  because  it  reduces  the  real  product  wage in
terms  of traded  goods. Third,  it  raises  demand  for  domestic  output. Thus the
net impact  of real depreciation  on private  investment  could  go either  way.10
This ambiguity  is  evident  in  empirical  results. Most econometric
studies  find  a negative  impact  of real  depreciation  on investment  in the
short-run  but a positive  impact  in the  long-run. For  example,  a short-run
adverse  effect  is found  by Musalam  (1989)  for  Mexico,  Solimano  (1989)  for
Chile,  Chhibber  and  Shafik  (1990)  for  Indonesia. Faini  and  de Melo (1991)
10 If capital  is  not  wholly  immobile  between  sectors,  then total
investment  demand  may fall  or rise (Lizondo  and  Montiel  1988)  depending  upon
whether  disinvestment  in  non-tradeable  sectors  is larger  or smaller  than  the
increase  in investment  in the  tradeable  sector.
10using  data  for  24  countries  confirm  the  same  result.  However  all  of  the  above
find  a  positive  impact  of  real  depreciation  over  the  longer\run.
It  is  recognized  that  private  and  public  investment  are  related.
However,  there  is  considerable  uncertainty  about  whether,  on  balance,
increases  in  total  public  sector  investment  raises  or  lowers  private
investment  (Von  Furstenberg  and  Malkiel  1977).  Empirical  evidence  remains
inconclusive.  This  is  because  public  investment  in  production  and  in
infrastructure  can  have  opposite  effects  on  private  investment.
However,  it  is  being  increasingly  acknowledged  that  public  investment  in
infrastructure  is  more  likely  to  be  complementary  tc  private  investment
because  it  raises  the  productivity  of  private  capital.  Several  studies  have
examined  this  empirically  (Aschauer  1990,  Galbis  1979,  Sundararajan  and  Thakur
1980,  Blejer  and  Khan  1984,  Chhibber  and  Van  Wijnbergen  1988,  Shafik  1991).
Only  a  few  studies  do  find  evidence  of  a  significant  complementary
relationship. 11 If  public  investment  in  infrastricture  and  private
investment  are  complements,  we  would  expect  that  the  coefficient  of  adjustment
of  private  investment  would  beccae  larger  as  the  rate  of  public  investment  in
infrastructure  increases,  implying  a  faster  response  of  private  investment.
Macroeconomic  instability  is  also  expected  to  have  an  adverse  effect  on
private  investment,  largely  due  to  the  uncertainty  it  creates  in  the
adjustment  process.
1 1Sundararajan  and  Thakur  (1980)  found  the  coefficient  of  the  public
sector  capital  stock  in  the  private  investment  equation  to  be  statistically
insignificant  in  both  countries  (India  and  the  Republic  of  Korea)  of  their
sample.  Shafik  (1991)  confirms  this  for  Egypt.
11On the  basis  of the  arguments  above,  we can  express  the  coefficient  of
adjustment  in  equation  (2)  as a function  of the  following  voriables. A linear
representation  of this  relationship  would  be
(4) A inbo-  l)  (biACRt+baFXRESe+b3RERe  + b#KPU+b 5 VAR)
where
ACR  - flow  of real  bank credit  to the  private  sector
KPU- real  public  sector  infrastructure  capital  stock
FXRES  - stock  of real  foreign  exchange  reserves
RER  - real  exchange  rate
VAR  - macroeconomic  instability  proxied  by variability  of macrovariables  like
RER  and inflation
Equation  (4)  states  that  the  response  of private  investment  to the  size
of the  discrepancy  between  desired  and  actual  investment  depends  on the
magnitude  of these  five  factors. 12 The signs  of the  parameters  in this
equation  are  expected  to  be:
b 1 -O  b2 O 4.0  b4 ,O N-<O
Substituting  equation  (4)  into  equation  (2)  yields
12See  SundararaJan  and  Thakur  (1980)  for  a similar  formulation.
12(5)  AZe=bo(It*-It_)  +biACRt+FXRSt+b 3 RER^t  b4 CPU+b 5 VAR
From  equations  (3)  and (1)  we have
(6)  Ie-[1-(1-4)LJK=(t-(l-o)LlaY'
and,  therefore,  we can  obtain  a dynamic  reduced-form  equation  for gross
private  investment  that  includes  expected  demand,  the  change  in  real  bank
credit,  stock  of real  reserves,  real  exchange  rate,  the  stock  of public
infrastructure  capital  and  macroeconomic  instability  as the  explanatory
variables:
(7)  It-boa[l-(1-8)  L] Yt'  bvCRt'b 2 PXES+.b 3RER+b4KPU+b5 VAR  (l-bo)  It1
13IV.  ECONOMETRIC  ESTIMATION  OF INVESTMENT  MQDEL
We estimate  the  investment  model  in  equation  (7)  by ordinary  least
squares  (OLS)  and by two  stage  least  squares  (TrLS). They  yield  similar
coefficient  estimates. Unlike  earlier  studies  we use a stock  variable  for
infrastructure,  since  it is  more likely  that  private  investment  is affected  by
changes  in the  stock  of  capital  rather  than  the  figw of public  investment.
Similarly,  instead  of using  current  receipts  of foreign  exchange  or current
foreign  exchange  reserves  we use lagged  reserves  in order  to avoid  any
simultaneity  bias.
The results  suggest  that  lower  availability  of credit  to the  private
sector  and  falling  public  infrastructure  capital  stock  has reduced  private
investment  over  the 1980s. Similarly,  lower  foreign  exchange  reserves  in the
years  following  the  collapse  of the  coffee  boom  has lowered  capital  imports.
The  negative  supply-shock  effect  seems  to dominate  the impact  of real
depreciation.  There  is  also econometric  evidence  to suggest  that  inability  to
control  fiscal  deficit  and its  money  financing,  as well  as failure  to restrain
current  expenditure  crowded  out  private  sector  credit  and lowered  public
investment  in infrastructure.
Estimation  Results
Ordinary  least  square  (OLS)  and  two  stage  least  squares  (TSLS)
estimation  used  annual  data  on  Kenya  for  the  period  1968-1988.
To avoid  spurious  correlation  and  non-stationarity,  the  investment  rate is
used (i.e.,  share  of investment  in  GDP) instead  of the  investment  level. In
14addition  the  real  rate is  used instead  of the  nominal  investment  rate. 13 In
the  case  of TSLS the  real  exchange  rate is instrumented  by  1ts  lagged  value
and  by the  lagged  value  of real  non-fuel  exports.
(i)  For  Total  Private  Investment
All  variables  have the  right  sign  in  Table  2 and  Table  3.14 The real
exchange  rate  and the  lagged  foreign  exchange  reserves  proxying  for  access  to
imports  are  consistently  significant  at 1% level  in  AUi  regressions. 15 So is
real  credit  to private  sector  and  public  stock  of infrastructure  capital. The
real  interest  rate,  the  index  of  macro  instability  and the  lagged  income
growth  rate  variables  are  not significant. Specification  (1)  in Tables  2 and
3  which  excludes  them  performs  the  best.  Our confidence  in this  estimated
private  investment  equation  is  supported  by our  tests  for specification  and
stability.
13lnvestment  is  expressed  in real  terms  as is customary. Though  some
(Anderson  1981)  have argued  for  using  nominal  values  on the  grounds  that
signals  are  transmitted  in  nominal  terms  and  that it is  difficult  to  represent
the  process  by which  these  signals  are  translated  from  nominal  into  a real
framework,  most  of their  arguments  are  not  relevant  for  Kenya.  This is
because  Kenya  has  had a fairly  steady  rate  of inflation  and  the  private  sector
is likely  to  anticipate  most  price  changes,  whereas  Anderson's  nominal
framework  implies  that  all  price  movements  are  unanticipated.
14The  matrix  of correlations  of the  private  real investment  rate  and  each
of the  explanatory  variables  show  only three  variables  to  be highly  correlated
with the  rate  of real  private  investment  with  simple  correlation  of 0.8:  the
real  exchange  rate,  the  stock  of foreign  exchange  reserves  and  the flow  of
foreign  exchange  receipts. These  three  variables  all  have strong  time  trends
through  the  1970s. Only  one  pair  of ex2lanato=r  variables  is  highly
correlated,  namely  the  current  stock  of foreign  exchange  reserves  and the
current  real  exchange  rate  probably  suggesting  that  devaluations  have  been
reserve  driven  contemporaneously.  However,  lagged  reserves  are  not so
correlated.
15The  stock  of foreign  exchange  resex-es  performs  better  as a proxy  for
restrictiveness  of licensing  than  the  flow  of foreign  exchange  receipts. The
"t"  statistic  of all  coefficients  is  higher,  and the  fit  of the  entire
equation  is improved. All equations  that  include  reserves  and the  real
exchange  rate  have adjusted  R-squared  of above  0.9.
15Table  2.  OLS  Estimation  Results  for  Private  Investment  Function
Dependent  variable  is real  private
investment/real  GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant,  C(1)  -2.406  -4.019  -2.390  -3.790
Real  Rate  of  Interest,  C(2)  - -0.849*  -0.769*
(-2.08)  (-1.82)
Flow of re4l credi.  to private  0.065  --  0.062"'  --
sector  as a ratio  to GDP,  C(2)  (4.02)  (3.80)
Foreign  Exchange  Reserves
as a rati'  to  GDP, C(3)  0.332"'  0.353"'  0.326  0.350**
(2  year sum,  lagged  1  period)  (7.98)  (7.44)  (7.82)  (6.65)
Real  Exchange  Rate,  C(4)  0.460"'  0.607"'  0.452  0.557"'
(Trade  weighted,  1985  - 100)  (3.52)  (4.35)  (3.48)  (3.19)
Infrastructure  Public  Capital  1.073**  0.516  1.102"'  0.562
stock  as a ratio  to  GDP, C(5)  (2.95)  (1.33)  (3.05)  (1.37)
Lagged GDP growth rate C(6)  --  --  0.994  1.270
(1.13)  (1.13)
R-BAR  SQUARED  0.96  0.93  0.96  0.93
F-STATISTIC  103.8  69.0  84.0  50.5
DURBIN-WATSON  1.41  1.69  1.42  1.80
N  20  20  20  20
White Statistic  1.432  --  5.771
Note:  1. All variables  are in  natural  log.
2. The sample  includes  annual  data from  1969  to 1988.
16Table  3:  TSLS  Estimation  Results  for  Private  Investuient  Function
Dependent  Variable  is Real  Private
Investment/Real  GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -2.414  -3.560  -2.470  -3.57
Real  Rate of Interest  -0.785*  -0.733'
(1.84)  (-1.80)
Flow  of Real Credit  to private
sector  as ratio  to  GDP  0.065"'  (3.80)  0.062"'
(4.02)
Foreign  Exchange  Reserves  0.332"  0.376  0.323  0.360"'
as a Ratio  to GDP  (7.66)  (6.80)  (7.46)  (6.54)
(2  Year Sum  lagged  1 period
Real  Exchange  Rate (Trade  0.462-'  0.502  0.467"'  0.508"'
Weighted  1985-100)  (3.25)  (2.63)  (3.72)  (2.70)
Infrastructure  Public  1.073-  0.467  1.100"'  0.547
Capital  Stock  as ratio  to  (2.95)  (1.13)  (3.05)  (1.33)
GDP
Lagged GDP Growth rate  --  --  0.988  1.303
(1.12)  (1.15)
R-BAR  SQUARE  0.96  0.93  0.96  0.93
DURBIN  WATSON  1.31  1.68  1.42  2.00
N  20  20  20  20
All  variables  are in logs. The real  exchange  rate is instrumented  by lagged
real  exchange  rate,  and  lagged  real  non-fuel  exports. Data in  parenthesis  are
the  t-statistics.
17The lagged  GDP growth  variable  is insignificant;  so are  all  other
conventional  proxies  for  expected  demand. Its  exclusion  fro>:  the  regression
improves  the  precision  of other  coefficient  estimates  without  reducing  the
overa.l  explanatory  power  of the  equation  (compare  specifications  (1)  and (2)
with (3)  and (4)  in  Tables  2 and  3 (not  shown  in Table  2  or 3).  This suggests
within-year  adjustment  of capital  stock.
Real interest  rate is  significant  only  at the  5% level. However  its
introduction  makes the  coefficient  for  infrastructure  capital  stock  less
precise  and  the  private  investment  function  less  stable. F  ther,  as we show
later  the  real  rate  of interest  is  not  significant  when the -,jations
explaining  the  differing  components  of private  investment  viz: equipment  and
buildings  investment  are  estimated  separately. Furthermore  when interest  rate
variable  is replaced  by the  flow  of credit  to  private  sector  as is  done in
specifications  (1)  and (3),  the  explanatory  power  of the  investment  function
rises  and all  coefficients  are  significant  et 1% level. 16 This is  perhaps
not surprising  given  that  interest  rates  were  administratively  controlled  in
Kenya  during  this  period. Changes  in  domestic  money  financing  of fiscal
deficit  were thus  reflected  in  changes  in  credit  to private  sector  than in
interest  rates.
Relaxation  of import  access  (proxied  by higher  lagged  reserves  in the
equation)  raises  private  investment  but  real  depreciation  reduces  it. 17 The
16A  visual  inspection  of the  recursive  coefficient  plots  show that  all
the  four  coefficient  estimates  for  the  equations  that  includes  the  rate  of
interest  variable  are  more  unstable  relative  to the  equation  that  includes
bank credit.
"7Branson  using  Kenyan  parameters  simulates  the-impact  of devaluation  on
investment  and  concludes  that  investment  falls  due  to the  supply  shock  effect
of devaluation.  (Branson  1986)
18elasticity  of the  private  investment  rate  with  respect  to reserves  is around
0.35 and  that  with respect  to the  real  exchange  rate  is in the  range  of 0.46
to 0.6.
The elasticity  of privato  investment  with respect  to credit  availability
is significant  in all  regressions. It is  worth  noting  that this  capW.ures
changes  in credit  mainly  for  working  capital  and thus  ignores  the constraints
on term  credit  for investment.  The  elasticity  implied  by the  results  is  thus
likely  to  be an underestimate  of the total  effect  of credit  availability. 18
There  is a strong  complementary  relationship  between  the  stock  of public
infrastructure  capital  and  private  investment. Private  investment  is unit
elastic  with respect  to infrastructure.  Thus  reductions  in  government
investment  expenditure  on infrastructure,  is likely  to affect  private
investment  with a lag  since  it  will take  time  to affect  shocK  of capital.
Efforts  to restrain  total  public  expenditure  will thus  affect  private
investment  adversely  if it  reduces  public  investment  in infrastructure  and
reduces  the  stock  of infrastructure  capital.
While  we can  read  off the  relevant  elasticities  from  the  coefficient
estimates  in  Tables  2 and 3, the  relative  importance  of each  variable  as a
determinant  of private  investment  is  not obvious  because  of differences  in the
units  of the  explanatory  variables. We thus  compute  standardized  betas (Theil
1980)  for  each  of the  coefficients  in two  best specifications  to indicate  the
relative  importance  of each  variable  in determining  private  investment. Table
4 reports  the  results.
18We  could  not obtain  time  series  data  oni  medium  term  credit
availability,  which is likely  to  be a  better  determinant  of investment.
19Table  4.  Beta  Coefficients  of  Private  Investment  Function




Flow  of  Real  Credit  0.256  0.280
Foreign  Exchange  Reserves  0.619  0.648
Real  Exchange  Rate  0.273  0.266
Infrastructure  Capital  Stock  0.182  0.181
Income  Growth  --  0.092
Source:  Computed  from  Table  2
In  relative  terms,  changes  in  lagged  foreign  exchange  reserves  or  rather
in  the  changes  in  restrictiveness  of  import  access  has  the  greatest  impact  on
private  investment.  Flow  of  real  credit  to  private  sector  and  real  exchange
rate  changes  come  next. Though  infrastructure  capital  stock  had  the  highest
value  for  elasticity  (see  Table  2  and  3)  and  flow  of  real  credit  the  lowest,
the  relative  importance  of  credit  as  a  determinant  of  private  investment  is
greater  that  infrastructure  capital  stock.  Lagged  income  growth  has  the
weakest  effect.
(ii) Components  of  Private  Investment
Tables  5  and  6  reports  the  results  of  both  OLS  and  TSLS  estimation  for
the  two  components  of  private  investment.  The  response  of  each  of  the  two
major  components  of  private  investment  (i,e.,  equipment  and  buildings)  to
changes  in  reserves  and  in  the  real  exchange  rate  are  similar  in  both  size  and
significance  to  that  for  total  private  investment.  The  same  is  not  true  for
the  other  determinants.
20Table  5.  OLS  Estimation  Results  for  Components  of Private  Investment
Dependent  variable  Buildings  Equipment
is  Real Priv.  Investment/GDP  in:
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -4.080  -3.826  -2.639 -2.637
Flow  of real  credit  to  private  -0.014  0.106**  0.105**
sector  as a ratio  to  GDP  (-0.72)  (3.90)  (3.76)
Foreign  exchange  reserves  as
a ratio  to  GDP  0.319"' 0.308"'  0.326**  0.325**
(2-year  sum, lagged  1  period)  (6.75)  (6.94)  (4.67)  (4.46)
Real exchange  rate  0.458"' 0.456"'  0.519*  0.518"
(trade  weighted,  1985  - 100)  (3.11)  (3.14)  (2.36)  (2.28)
Public  infrastructure  capital  0.825'  0.979  1.422*  1.426*
stock  as a ratio  to GDP  (2.01)  (2.80)  (2.33) (2.25)
Lagged  growth  of GDP  1.872'  1.74  0.149
(1.88)  (1.80)  (0.09)
R-BAR  SQUARED  0.92  0.92  0.91  0.90
F STATISTIC
DURBIN-WATSON  2.27  2.24  1.96  0.97
N  20  23  20  20
Notes:  1.  All  variables  are in  natural  logs  and  the interest  rate
variable  is  dropped  as it is insignificant  at 10%.
2.  The sample  includes  annual  data  from  1969  to 1988.
21Table  6.  TSLS  Estimation  Results  for  Components  of Private.\Investment
Dependent  variable  Buildings  Equipment
is  Real Priv.  Investment/GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -4.699  -4.806  -2.416  -2.396
Flow  of real  credit  to  private  -0.014  --  0.106**  0.106**
sector  as a ratio  to  GDP  (-0.75)  (3.70) (3.91)
Foreign  exchange  reserves  as
a ratio  to GDP  0.291** 0.264"'  0.335**  0.337*"
(2-year  sum,  lagged  1  period)  (5.79)  (5.83)  (4.42)  (4.63)
Real  exchange  rate  0.586"'=  0.672**  0.472* 0.469*
(trade  weighted,  1985  - 100)  (3.59)  (5.13)  (1.92)  (1.97)
Public  infrastructure  capital  0.845'  1.049  1.419**  1.413"
stock  as a ratio  to GDP  (2.01)  (2.89)  (2.24)  (2.31)
Lagged  growth  of GDP  1.826'  1.586  0.166  --
(1.78)  (1.58)  (0.11)
R-BAR  SQUARED  0.92  0.92  0.90  0.91
F STATIFT'C  43.4  58.8  34.9  46.7
DURBIN-i  rSON  2.29  2.15  0.98  0.97
N  20  21  20  20
Though  public  infrastructure  capital  stock  is significant  for  both
components  of private  investment,  the  coefficients  are  significantly  higher
for  equipment  investment.  This is  quite  plausible  since  manufacturing
dominates  equipment  investment  and  the  profitability  of manufacturing
investment  appears  to  be  more  dependent  on  infrastructure.  On the  other  hand,
changes  in the  availability  of credit  does  not  affect  buildings  investment.
This is  surprising. One  possibility  is that  it reflects  the  effect  of
restrictions  on credit  flows  to housing  and  real  estate  investment. However,
22given  what  we  know  about  the  fungibility  of  credit  in  Kenya,  this  is  not
plausible.  The  other  possibility  is  that  these  investors  u  e their  own
retained  earnings  because  it  is  a  useful  way  of  understating  taxable  earnings.
In  any  case  it  appears  from  the  data  that  the  impact  of  private  sector  credit
availability  on  total  private  investment  arises  from  its  effect  on  equipment
investment. 19
Adiustment  Policies  Affecting  Private  Investment
Fiscal  policy,  nominal  exchange  rate  policy  and  trade  policy  constitute
the  core  components  of most  adjustment  programs. Changes  in these  policies
affect  credit  availability,  infrastructure  investment  and  reserves  which  in
turn  affect  the  speed  and  direction  of  investor  response  to  the  gap  between
actual  and  desired  capital  stock.
" 9Again,  this  may  be  because  most  capital  equipment  are  imported  and  the
process  of  importing  is  highly  credit-intensive  because  of  the  time-consuming
process  of  importing.
23At the  simplest  level,  an increase  in fiscal  deficit  without  additional
inflow  of foreign  savings,  must lead  to either  an increase  4n private  savings
or a decrease  in  private  investment. 20 How  much  of the  change  is  borne  by a
decrease  in  private  investment  depends  on how fiscal  deficits  affect  the
availability  of credit  to the  private  sector. 21
A clear  negative  relationship  between  bank credit  to  private  sector  and
the  size  of the  fiscal  deficit  and/or  by flow  of real  credit  to public  sector
which  finances  the  fiscal  deficit  establishes  the  empirical  link  between
fiscal  policy  and  private  investment.  Table  7  provides  results  of regressions
that  attempt  to estimate  the  link  between  fiscal  policy  and  real  credit  to,
private  sector.
2This is  evident  from  the  standard  national  income  identity.
(G-T)  _  (Sp  - Ip)  +  (K-X)
Fiscal  deficit  - net  private  savings +  foreign  savings
21Probably  the  most  powerful  instrument  through  which  credit  to  private
sector  is crowded-out  is the  use  of ceilings  on total  bank credit  and  on
credit  to government. Credit  to the  private  sector  is residually  determined
after  accommodating  the  financing  needs  of the  government. Central  Bank's
control  over  the  minimum  levels  and  composition  of liquid  reserves  of
commercial  banks  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  provide  another
instrument  for  channelling  credit  to  government  in  Kenya.
24Table  7:  Fiscal  Deficit  and  Private  Sector  Credit
Dependent  Variable  Real  Private  Sector  Credit  as  Real  Credit
Share  of GDP  to Private
Sector
1968-88  1974-88  1968-88
(1)  (2)  (3)
1.  Constant  -0.69  -1.42  -1831.5
2.  Fiscal Deficit/GDP  -0.39  --  --
(2.26)
3.  Growth of GDP  25.7*  --  --
(1.92)
4.  Real  Credit  to Public  -0.52
Sector/GDP  (2.11)
5.  Real  Lending  Rate  -644.4"
(-1.95)
6.  Real Credit to Public  --  -0.41"
Sector  (-2.03)
7.  Real GDP  0.07**
(2.91)
Adjusted  R2 0.39  0.45  0.68
All  coefficients  related  to the  financing  of fiscal  deficit  confirm  the
"crowding  out"  effect  of increased  fiscal  deficit. Thus if fiscal  adjustment
is  successful  in reduci.ng  deficits,  the  availability  of credit  to  private
sector  will improve  and  private  investment  will rise.  However,  if reduction
in  deficit  is  undertaken  through  reduction  in expenditure  and this  is
disproportionately  borne  by government's  investment  expenditure  especially  on
infrastructure,  as  has  happened  in  Kenya  private  investment  will fall.
25Nominal  exchange  rate  actions  and fiscal  policy,  especially  changes  in
level  and  composition  of government  expenditure  affect  the  Neal  exchange  rate.
Changes  in  nominal  exchange  rate is  often  an integral  part of adjustment
programs  for  purposes  of altering  the  real  exchange  rate.  Since  countries
like  Kenya import  the  bulk  of their  machinery  and  equipment  for investment,
the  cost of investment  depends  on the  relative  price  of investment  good
imports. The  elasticity  of the  relative  price  of investment  goods  with
respect  to the  real  exchange  rate  has  been important  in  many countries  (Faini
and  de Helo 1991). The  result  for  Kenya is  shown  in  Table  9.
26Table  9.  Relative  Price  of Investment  Goods
and the  Real Exchange  Rate
(1968--1988)
Degendent  Variable: Investment  Deflator/GDP  Deflator
(1)  (2)
Constant  5.257  1.987
Real Exchange  Rate  -1.127  -0.422w
(-9.79)  (-1.96)
Construction  Price  --  1.042*
(3.08)
Adjusted  R  0.83  0.91
Durbin  Watson  Statistic  1.42  1.92
AR (1)  0.342
(1.48)
Notes:  All  variables  are  in logs  and  data in parenthesis
show  the  t-statistics.  Construction  price is the
ratio  of construction  deflator  to GDP deflator  and
real  exchange  rate  is 1985  trade  weighted  (top  20
partner)  index.
The  results  suggest  that  a real  depreciation  will  have a substantial
adverse  effect  on private  investment  in the  short  to  medium  run  by raising  the
cost  of capital. However,  this  adverse  effect  must  be balanced  against
27whatever  efficiency-enhancing  effect  results  from lower  distortion  in the
price  of investment  goods.
In Kenya's  case there  is also  some  evidence  (specification  2) that
domestic  price  of construction  has also  raised  the  relative  price  of
investment  goods. This is consistent  with other  studies  of Kenya's  coffee
boom (Bevan  et al)  where  they  find  that  accelerated  increases  in domestic
investment  financed  by coffee  boom  revenues  raised  the  price  of construction
due to low  short-run  price  elasticity  in  this  sector.
28V.  MODEL  APPLIED: POLICY  SIMULATIONS
Since  the  coffee  boom  of the  1970s  virtually  all  factors  have  worked
against  private  investment.  Thus  policy  simulations  confirm  that  if policies
involving  money financing  of deficit  and  public  investment  were unchanged
relative  to 1978,  Kenya  would  have  had substantially  higher  private  investment
rates  in the  1980s. However,  if  reserves  fell  as it actually  did,  private
investment  would  remain  considerably  lower  notwithstanding  fiscal  adjustment.
It is  a moot  point  whether  reserves  would  decline  as much as it  did if fiscal
adjustment  was successful. Policy  simulations  also show  that  though  real
depreciation  has an adverse  direct  effect  on private  investment  it  has a
favorable  indirect  effect  in the  medium  term,  because  depreciation  helps  to
relax  the  foreign  exchange  constraint.
Fiscal  Policy  and Import  Liberalization
Fiscal  policy  directly  affects  two  of the  determinants  of private
investment  in  Kenya:  credit  availability  to  private  sector  and  public  stock
of infrastructure  capital. 22 Policy  simulations  (using  equation  (1)  of Table
3 and  unchanged  1978  values  for  credit  and  infrastructure)  show  that  private
investment  in the  1980s  (e.  g. 1982-88)  would,  on average,  have been around
twenty  three  percent  higher  than  they  were in that  period  if these  two  fiscal
variables  had  maintained  their  1978  levels  in the  1980s.  Figure  3 shows  that
22By  applying  the  estimated  coefficients  froim  equation  (1)  to the  actual
values  of real  private  sector  credit  and infrastructure  capital  stock,  we find
that  around  two-fifth  of the  decline  in  private  investment  between 1978  and
1988  is explained  by these  two  variables.
29SIMULATION  WITH CONSTANT  FISCAL POLICY










1978  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988
0  Actual  (fitted)  +  1978  Credit &  Infro
30Figure  4
EFFECT OF POLICY ON INVESTMENT
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0  A  +  B  O  C  A  Drestoring  availability  of credit  to the  private  sector  has a dominant  effect,
both  because  it is a relatively  more important  determinant  of  Kenyan  private
investment  and  because  it declined  substantially  in the  1980s.  Thus if  Kenya
had succeeded  in adjusting  i.e.  in  restraining  money-financing  of fiscal
deficit  and  in controlling  expansion  of current  expenditure  at the  cost of
capital  expenditure,  private  investment  would  have fared  better.
Figure  4  helps  to  highlight  the  fact  that  appropriate  fiscal  adjustment
(e.g.  1978iwould  not  be sufficient  to raise  investment  to 1980  levels). The
simulations  show  what  would  have  happened  to investment  as both fiscal  policy
variables  are  restored  to their  1978  level. For  example  private  investment
rate in 1985  could  be nearly  twice  the  actual  rate  of 5.5%  of GDP:  with only
real  credit  to  private  sector  maintained  at 1978  level.  Private  investment
rate  would  be 7.3% (line  B),  with  both credit  and infrastructure  maintained
(i.e.  graph  C if fiscal  adjustment  succeeded  in  maintaining  them)  instead  of
the  actual  of 5.5%  shown  in  base run  A.
Enhanced  import  allocations  proxied  by reserves  at levels  of 1978  would
make the  largest  contribution  to restoring  investment  rates.  Difference
between  Graphs  C and  D in Figure  4 shows  the  size  of this  contribution. In
1985,  it could  raise  investment  from  7.8%  to 10.5%  of GDP.
Impact  of Real Devaluatior
Though  the  sign  of real  exchange  rate  in the  private  investment  equation
is  negative,  policy  simulations  suggest  that  the  overall  effect  of real
depreciation  in the  medium-term  would  be favorable. The favorable  inuirect
effect  arises  from  the  relaxation  of foreign  exchange  constraint  that  occurs
32due to  depreciation-induced  improvement  in trade  balance. A simultaneous
equation  model  would  have captured  this  indirect  effect  eas1ly.
In its  absence,  we try  to capture  this in  an ad  hoc manner. Real
depreciation  affects  both export  supply  and import  demand,  the  magnitude  of
which  depend  on their  price-sensitivity.  This influences  trade  balance  and
thus  foreign  exchange  reserves. 3 We use the  estimated  export  supply  and
import  demand  equations  shown  in  Table  10 in  conjunction  with the  estimated
private  investment  function  to simulate  the  effects  of real  depreciation.
Figure  5 compares  the  behavior  of  private  investment  under  one-shot  and
gradual  real  depreciation.  The  no depreciation  (baseline)  scenario  captures
essentially  the  effect  of lagged  reserves. The  one-shot  15%  real depreciation
in  year  T and  the  gradual 24 15%  real  depreciation  equally  phased  over three
years  (T,  T+1  and  T+2) are  shown  (see  Figure  5).
3Host  of the  positive  effects  of real  depreciation  on reserves  comes  out
of decreases  in total  non-fuel  imports. This is  because  price  elasticity  of
exports  is much  lower  than imports. Given  Kenya's  past policy  regime  and the
resulting  predominance  of relatively  inelastic  exports  (e.g.,  coffee,  tea,
sisal)  in  Kenyan  exports,  this  is  not surprising. The ne effect  of
depreciation  on imports  is adjusted  for the  increase  in imports  that results
from  higher  export  earnings  and reserves.
24Since  real  depreciation  is  a function  of nominal  depreciation  and
demestic  fiscal  monetary  policy  stance,  gradual  real  depreciation  could  also
be  viewed  as slow  "pass  through"  of a large  nominal  devaluation.
33Real  Depreciation  and  Investment
Sudden  vs.  Gradual  Depreciation
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Sample  1967  to 1988  1966  to 1988
Constant  9.107  0.7z4
Export  Price/GDP  Deflator  (t-l)  0.135*
(1.675)
Import  Price/GDP  Deflator  -1.135--
(3.56)
Actual  Trend/Real  Output  (t-l)  -0.349"'
(3.020)
Real  Exchange  Rate  -0.279  -0.468
(3.726)  (2.15)
Real  Output  1.067"'
(5.52)
Flow  of Forex  0.587
(5.52)
Dummy  for  1986  0.156**
(3.073)
Adjusted  R2 0.82  0.80
Durbin  Watson  1.81  1.45
Note:  All  variables  except  dummies  are  in logs.
A one-shot  raJl  depreciation  of 15%  lowers  private  investment  sharply
but returns  to the  no-depreciation  baseline  level  in two  years.  A similar
pattern  is  obtained  for  the  gradual  real  depreciation.  However,  the  gradual
35case implies  a lower  initial  decline  in private  investment,  a delayed  recovery
relative  to the  one-shot  case:  after  the  initial  decline,.private  investment
rises  to equal  the  no-depreciation  investment  path in  two  and a  half years.
Though  gradual  depreciation  retards  the investment  response  relative  to one-
shot  depreciation,  in the  medium  term  real  depreciation  encourages  private
investment.
CONCLUSION
Failure  to implement  adjustment  policies  after  the  collapse  of the  -
coffee  boom  and the  common  market  undermired  private  investment. Though  Kenya
has experienced  relatively  greater  macroeconomic  stability  than  other  Sub-
Saharan  countries,  her fiscal  performance,  both  during  and after  the  1970s
boom,  leaves  a lot  to  be desired. Her  failure  to control  current  expenditure
has adversely  affected  public  investment  in infrastructure.  It  has also
undermined  her ability  to reduce  the  fiscal  deficit,  and the  money financing
of that  deficit. The latter  in turn  has reduced  the  flow  of real  credit  to
the  private  sector. Furthermore  higher  fiscal  deficits  arising  from
uncontrolled  current  expenditure  has at  worst  generated  pressures  for  raising
2A major  qualification  to this  analysis  in-addition  to the  assumptions,
lies  in the  fact  that  the  reserve  impact  excludes  f_q.l  from  both export  and
import,  which  has  been an unstable  factor  in  the  actual  path of Kenya's
reserves.
36import  controls  and  has  at best  undermined  credibility  of trade
liberalization. 26 Both  enhanced  uncertainty  of  private  investors'  access  to
imported  capital  goods.
Thus efficient  fiscal  adjustment  and increased  liberal  import
allocations  will be critical  to  raising  private  investment  in  Kenya.  Fiscal
deficits  should  be reduced  preferably  through  reductions  in  current
expenditure  that  exceed  reductions  in total  expenditure.
Such fiscal  adjustment  is  likely  to  provide  the  biggest  payoff  in terms
of private  investment. It  would  raise  public  investment  expenditure  including
that  on infrastructure,  and  reduce  money  financing  of deficit,  both conducive
to  enhancing  private  investment. Furthermore,  sustained  trade  liberalization
would  be facilitated  by such  fiscal  adjustment  which  would in turn  reduce
uncertainty  of access  to imports  for  private  investors.
26Private  investors  may  not  respond  to the  liberalization-induced  rise in
profitability  of tradable  sector  because  poor  fiscal  performance  raise  serious
questions  about  the  sustainability  of liberalizaEion.  Even if  private
investors  do  view the  trade  liberalization  as credible  increased  fiscal
deficits  or lower  infrastructure  investment  will have  an offsetting  negative
influence  on  profitability  of private  investment.
37Appendix
Data
We obtain  data for  all  of the  variables  in expression  (7).  Fixed
investment  and  GDP  data  are  obtaineca  from the  Statistical  Abstract. Public
and  private  investment  data in  current  and  constant  prices  are  used to compute
the  investment  deflator  for  private  investment  at 1964  prices,  the  first  year
for  which  such  data  was  available. Real  private  investment  expressed  as a
ratio  of real  GDP is the  dependent  variable. The equipment  component  of
private  investment  is the  sum  of private  investment  in machinery,  transport
equipment  and  other  equipment. The  building  component  includes  residential,
non-residential  and other  construction.
Various  proxies  are tried  for income. Since  the  accelerator  effect
appeared  weak in the  more  usual  demand  variables  like  real income  level  and
growth  in income,  we try  expected  income  growth  and  lagged  real income
growth. 27 Expected  income  growth  was obtained  by extrapolating  income  growth
trend  of three  years (current  and  previous  two  years)  to  obtain  year's  income
27Re&-essing  the  real  rate  of  private  investment  on the  change  in the  log
of income  alone,  gives  a coefficient  significant  at the  95 percent  confidence
level  and  an  R squared  of 0.19.  Regressed  on the  expected  and  unexpected
portions  of income  growth,  the  coefficient  of expected  growth  becomes
significant  at the  99  percent  level,  the  coefficrent  of unexpected  growth
which  is  negative  insignificant  at the  95 percent  level,  and  the  R squared
becomes  0.45.  None  of these  coefficients  are  significant,  however,  wlhen  more
variables  are  added  to the  regression  analysis.
38growth. However,  it  was not significant  in  most  specifications. 28 Lagged
income  growth  works  best, though  it is  an unlikely  proxy  for  expected  demand.
Since data series
Real  Deposit  and  Len'ing  Interest  Rates
on the  lending  rate  of  ,
interest  is short,  we
used  the  deposit  rate  of  2
interest. Annex  Figure  D
A-1 shows  that  the  .
lending  and  deposit  rates
are  highly  correlated
(coefficient  of  low  - 4m  3  m7  u1Xx  ,u
correlation - .97).  The
real  interest  rate  is  Figure  A-i
obtained  by subtracting  the  rate  of inflation  (i.e.  changes  in the  GDP
deflator)  from  the  nominal  deposit  rate.  Log  of one  plus  the  real interest
rate  is the  variable  we use  for  estimating  expression  (7).
The  nominal  value  of the  flow  of credit  to private  sector  is deflated  by
the  GDP deflator  to obtain  real  credi.t  flow  which is then  normalized  by the
real  GDP.
Real  public  infrastructure  capital  stock  is calculated  by assuming  a 5
percent  depreciation  rate  using  the  perpetual  inventory  method. Two  public
infrastructure  series  are  constructed  based  on two  public  investment  series.
28We  used only  a three  year  trend  because  we wanted  to conserve  data
points. The three  year  period  moved. Thus the  log  of GDP in  1969  was
predicted  by the  extrapolation  of the  1966-68  trend  regression. Expected  GDP
growth  was the  difference  between  this  prediction  and  the  log  of actual  GDP in
1968. The  R-squared  of the  regression  measured  confidence  in  the  prediction.
Actual  (log)  GDP in 1969  less  predicted  GDP is  unexpected  growth. For 1970,
we projected  from  1967-69  data,  etc.
39The  more inclusive  of these  series  i.e.  infra:broad  accumulates  investment  in
government  services,  building  and  construction,  electricity\and  water  and
transport,  storage  and  communications.  The  other  i.e.  infra:narrow  excludes
investment  in government  services. The real  public  infrastructure  capital
stock  series  is then  normalized  by real  GDP.
To capture  the  effects  of changes  in import  allocations,  we try  both the
stock  of reserves  as  well  as the  flow  of receipts  of foreign  exchange.  The
beginning-of-year  dollar  stock  of foreign  exchange  reserves  obtained  from  the
Internatio,al  Financial  Statistics  (IMF,  various  issues)  is deflated  by the
import  price  index  and  expressed  as a ratio  to  Kenya's  1980  dollar  GDP,  both
obtained  from  World  Bank  data files. The reserves  to  GDP ratio  both at the
beginning  of the  year  and those  at the  beginning  of the  previous  year are
highly  significant. Since  their  regression  coefficients  are  not significantly
different,  we thus  conserve  degrees  of freedom  by using  the  average  of the two
years  reserves. We lag  this  to  avoid  simultaneity  problems.
The real  exchange  rate index  is the  ratio  of Kenyan  CPI to  a weighted
average  of partner  country  wholesale  price  indices. The  weights  are  based  on
1985  shares  of the  top  twenty  trading  partners  of Kenya. An increase  in  this
index  implies  real  appreciation.
The  matrix  of correlation  coefficients  among  these  variables  are  shown
in  the  Table. The  matrix  of correlations  of the  private  real investment  rate
and  each  of the  explanatory  variables  show  only three  variables  to  be highly
correlated  with the  rate  of real  private  investment  with simple  correlation  of
0.8:  the  real  exchange  rate,  the  stock  of foreign  exchange  reserves  and the
flow  of foreign  exchange  recei,'ts.  These  three  variables  all  have strong  time
trends  through  the  1970s. Only  one  pair of  explanatory  variables  is  highly
40correlated,  namely  the  current  stock  of foreign  exchange  reserves  and the
current  real  exchange  rate  probably  suggesting  that  devalu4ions have been
reserve  driven  contemporaneously.  However,  lagged  reserves  are  not so
correlated.
41Table:  Correlation  Coefficients  Matriz
1.  2  3  4  5  6  78910
1  1  0.48  0.84  -0.22  0.68  0.94  0.94  0.76  0.73  -0.44
2  1  0.28  -0.19  0.35  0.36  0.54  0.5  -0.54  -0.42
3  1  0.03  0.49  0.88  0.75  0.48  -0.63  0.40
4  1  -0.43  -0.23  -0.14  -0.36  0.20  0.24
5  1  0.62  0.64  0.44  -0.67  -0.57
6  1  0.85  0.69  -0.67  -0.39
7  1  0.73  -0.67  -0.39
8  1  -0.58  -0.34
9  1  0.89
10  1
Variable  Names:
1  Real  Private  Investment/Real  GDP
2  Real  GDP  Growth
3  Real  Exchange  Rate
4  Real  Interest  Rate
5  Real  Bank  Lending/Real  GDP
6  Real  Foreign  Exchange  Reserves/Real  GDP
7  Flow  of Real Foreign  Exchange  Earnings/Real  GDP
8  Real  Public  Sector  Investment/Real  GDP
9  Real  Public  Infrastructure  Capital  (Board)/Real  GDP
10  Real  Public  Infrastructure  Capital  (Narrow)/Real  GDP
Note:  All  variables  are  in logs.
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